Muddy Waters: An Interview with Stanley Fish by Stavreva, Kirilka & Simonson, Peter
Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies
Volume 1995, Issue 14 1995 Article 14
Muddy Waters: An Interview with Stanley
Fish
Kirilka Stavreva∗ Peter Simonson†
∗
†
Copyright c©1995 by the authors. Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.uiowa.edu/ijcs
MUDDY WATERS: 
AN INTERVIEW WITH STANLEY FISH
Kirilka Stavreva and Peter Simonson
This interview with Stanley Fish was conducted in October, 1994, when he 
delivered a series of lectures at the University of Iowa’s Law School and English 
Department. Prof. Fish’s numerous publications include Surprised by Sin, Self- 
Consuming Artifacts, Is There a Text in This Class?, Doing What Comes 
Naturally, and There's No Such Thing as Free Speech.
KS: You ’re presently holding a dual appointment at Duke University as Arts and 
Science Professor of English and Professor of Law...
...And Director of the Duke University Press. I’m also a member of the 
Comparative Program in Literature.
KS: Your rhetoric, and I would say your thinking in recent works, bears the mark 
of both law and literature. You frequently employ arguments from one field to 
make a point in another...
But it’s the differences that interest me, not the similarities.
KS: How would you compare your crossing between fields with the interdisci­
plinary practices of people in literary studies like Catherine Belsey, Stephen 
Greenblatt, Gregory Bredbeck, or historians like Carlo Ginsburg, Natalie 
Zemon Davis, Guido Ruggiero, for example ?
All of these people, of course, operate differently, so I don’t want to make any 
off-the-cuff comparisons. In the sense that what I do could be thought of as 
interdisciplinary, it’s fractiorum, rather than all at once. That is, on one day I’ll 
be sitting for hours in meetings at the Duke University Press. We’ll be discussing
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matters like the length of print runs or pricing policies, or organizational 
questions having to do with the systematization of communication between 
production and design, on the one hand, and the warehouse and computer 
operations, on the other. That’s a whole set of concerns which are dealt with by 
theories or skills or a body of expertise that must be in my control. But these are 
not skills or bodies of knowledge that have much to do either with the work I do 
when I teach Renaissance poetry, or when I teach a course in contracts or legal 
history. I do not think of myself as embodying many perspectives which I then 
put together in some creative and synthetic way to produce an interdisciplinary 
perspective. Rather I think of myself as someone who lives in a series of different 
worlds or houses, each with its own set of constitutive and normative practices.
KS: Would you refer to these as performative practices?
I don’t use the word “performative” because I am a student of speech act theory. 
Most of the people in literary theory and cultural studies who use the terms of 
speech act theory haven’t the slightest idea of what they’re talking about. So I 
stay away from that language unless I’m talking about speech act theory in 
relation to [J.L.] Austin’s work and other kinds of work in the philosophy of 
language. When people following [Paul] de Man start talking about performance 
and performativity I get off that train because they are using the vocabulary but 
not for any of the purposes or reasons for which it was articulated. Now I don’t 
blame people for doing that. Intellectual work is full of the same phenomena 
where one quarries from another discipline a set of terms and then appropriates 
them for whatever use they can find for them in their own discipline, which 
would not be a use authorized or even recognized by the members of the 
discipline from which it was quarried.
KS: And you have a problem with this kind of appropriation?
I don’t. I only have a quarrel with it when it’s something that I’m intimately 
connected with. If cultural studies or literary theory people want to use speech 
act terminology for their own purposes, and it helps them, fine. But I’m so 
invested in speech act theory as speech act theory that I can’t do it.
KS: To go back to the point you were making, you put on different hats in different 
places...
That’s right, I actualize different skills. Another thing I do which is not always 
noted in any of these official appointments, is that I am in general an adminis­
trator. I’ve been an administrator for 15 or 16 years, and a lot of my thinking about 
questions is administrative thinking, which is still another area with its own set 
of problems, protocols, questions, rewards, successes and failures.
PS: If I could follow up on that, in the John F. Murray lecture in Law yesterday
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you referenced Alasdair MacIntyre a couple of times. In a way you and 
MacIntyre come from a similar angle in that you *re both critics of liberalism...
That’s quite correct.
PS: .. .and you talk about local practices. On the other hand, it strikes me that 
he would dispute your claim that local practices have integrity in the modern 
world—that’s just the problem for him.
That’s a good question. I just taught MacIntyre in a seminar. It’s precisely at that 
point where my own statements about interpretive communities and his come 
together and produce this question which you just asked. So I would have to agree 
with MacIntyre that when one is involved in any practice or community-specific 
work, not only are the norms and requirements of the practice in mind; there is 
something else in mind which is not so much separate from but grows along with 
the demands of the practice. And that is a general question which he never put 
in this way but which I am willing to put in this way: What kind of person do you 
want to be? I just formulated it this summer, precisely in the course of teaching 
MacIntyre and responding to questions from a very, very good seminar at the 
Dartmouth School of Criticism and Theory. I’ll use as the example my own 
personal case—it is always my desire or goal or purpose or hope just to be a good 
person. I would put it in that flat a way, aware of the easy ridicule that could be 
directed at such a statement. Being a good person and having in mind that you 
want to be may take different forms, specific to the particular enterprise—any of 
the ones that I’m involved in, the press, a professor of literature, a professor of 
law. But interacting with and shaping my understanding of the demands of the 
discipline, would be this continuous, carried-along-with-me sense of myself as 
someone who wants to be a good person. And I think that MacIntyre might agree 
with that.
PS: It strikes me as an important difference that MacIntyre thinks there needs to 
be an independent standard of rationality or norms...
It’s not clear to me that he believes there needs to be an independent standard of 
rationality.
PS: Community-specific, perhaps?
Well, so do I for that matter. No part of my argument has ever privileged 
individual norms and standards. In fact, in my writings I always call into question 
ideas like individual norms and standards. One of the criticisms you could make 
of my work is that it leaves too little room for the individual, and to be more 
specific doesn’t seem to have any genuine place for the notion of choice.
KS: I ’d like to get some clarification on this point. I ’m thinking of your article
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“Change” where you're looking at interpretive communities as the site or 
engine of “orderly” change. It didn ’t really become clear to me what were the 
mechanics of change, how it happened and whether it squared with things like 
individual agency and individual responsibility.
Good question. Let’s take them in order. Change can happen in almost any way, 
and one of the things I say in that essay is that you can never tell in advance what 
in fact will be the agency of change. My only argument that is strongly made in 
that essay is that change will never come from the outside. It is always made 
possible by something already internal to practices which enables an “external” 
phenomena to trigger change. The best example I have recently come upon of 
this model of change was of a former white supremacist—an articulate defender 
of his position and always around to talk to the news media—who was instantly 
changed when he heard listed among the people whose removal would be a first 
order of business when the white supremacists won, people with hairlips, cleft 
palates. His daughter was in fact a person with a cleft palate, and that was instant 
conversion. It’s a good example for me because it’s obviously the case that you 
cannot say that most people in a group will have a daughter with a cleft palate.
KS: Would that kind of instant conversion affect the communicative web of the 
group ?
No, not at all, because they would see him as just someone who was insufficiently 
committed to the enterprise. But it works as an example of why change can’t 
come from the outside. Persuasion was a function of a particular fact about him, 
which led him I guess to just snap out or catapult himself out of a set of 
assumptions within which he had been proceeding. Now that leads me to another 
point I made in the essay, which is that the mind, or consciousness, is not a set 
of items that is arranged in some static fashion. Rather, the mind is a dynamic, 
interacting infinity of commitments, beliefs, convictions, some of which can at 
points rise up to challenge some other. This language is of course too anthropo­
morphic to bear very much scrutiny. And it is a question, as I put it in that essay, 
of a nexus of beliefs and commitments. So presumably what this example reveals 
for this particular person was that his commitments to his family and his daughter 
were finally going to override his commitments to the philosophy of white 
supremacy that he had been disseminating and defending for a long time.
PS: Yesterday you mentioned that among the fragments that are in your head is 
Augustine, and 1 wonder if that is anAugustinian notion of re-direction of loves?
Yes, that’s right. I say this when someone tries to describe me as some kind of 
Leftist radical, which is one of the most absurd descriptions that one could 
imagine. But I describe myself as a radical conservative composed in some sense 
of equal parts of Augustine and Thomas Hobbes, which is not such a bad 
combination if you think about it.
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KS: And Milton?
Well, that’s just like breathing after 33 years. It would be hard to imagine myself, 
quite literally, independently of my thoughts about Milton.
PS: One more question about philosophical allegiances. I recently taught your 
essay, “There’s no such thing as free speech, and it’s a good thing too, ” and we 
read it after we read Bentham and MacIntyre on rights. Some of my students 
wanted to say thatyou were a utilitarian, some wanted to say that you were a kind 
of communitarian, and I wonder if you count yourself as a pragmatist.
Fascist. Of course I give a deliberately provocative answer to a generously-posed 
question. Since I re-identify speech harms as injuries which will appear to be 
injuries only to certain persons and not to other persons, my recommendation is 
that, because universal agreement as to what does or doesn’t constitute injury 
will never be achieved, what you want to do is get hold of the machinery that will 
be defining what is and is not injury. And make sure that the speech you favor 
gets into the category of “protected,” and that the speech you disfavor gets into 
the category of “available for regulation.” That’s going to sound like, and in fact 
is, an argument that you should get the power, so you can arrange the relevant 
structures in society to the advantage of your agenda. And to a lot of people, that 
sounds something like fascism.
PS: That also sounds utilitarian, that interests are sort of the hard nut on top of 
which a superstructure is built.
Well, utilitarian—which utilitarian? Not the greatest good for the greatest 
number. Maybe you’re thinking of instrumental.
PS: Bentham wrote that rights are “nonsense on stilts ” and that what we really 
have are interests of various sorts.
Rights, that’s something we haven ’ t gotten into. But in the context of free speech, 
it’s quite clear that the notion of rights produces a situation in which only 
speakers have rights. Hearers don’t. The idea of receiving something doesn’t 
seem to involve any hard problems, and that’s because people assume that what 
you hear or what you see or what’s put before your eyes couldn’t possibly harm 
you because you’re a rational person invested with the power of choice, and you 
can push away what you don’t like, or turn the dial, or not go on the street where 
the pornography is sold or pull your window shade and all that. In effect that says 
that only speakers or purveyors of print have rights, because they’re the ones who 
are doing something. Whereas you have the total control over whether or not 
what they do in any way affects you. I simply don’t believe that. It seems to me 
that the kind of culture one inhabits will impinge on one in all kinds of ways, 
restrict forms of thought, make you into the kind of person who sees this way
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Irather than that way. Cultural studies people need to decide the question of 
whether or not cultural work works, whether you think that in fact the images and 
words that are put out in the world make a difference—a difference which is not 
always in our control to monitor. I think that is the case, and therefore a view of 
speech rights which gives the privilege to expression seems to me to necessarily 
legitimate all kinds of harms which are not recognized because of the assumption 
that you can always avoid them by just walking away.
PS: Let me ask you a question about reason. Both in your talk at the law school 
yesterday and in There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, you attack liberalism’s 
ideals of reason and justice as fundamentally flawed. Both attacks hinge on 
liberalism’s aspiration to conceive of a universal reason andjustice independent 
of particular, partisan interests and concerns.
That’s correct.
PS: This argument parallels a number of your other writings, where you defend 
the local and embedded realm of particular interests against abstract or 
universal claims made by friends of things like foundationalist theory or literal 
meaning.
Or Habermassian public forum arguments.
PS: I wonder if there isn't a middle realm that these dichotomies smooth over. 
For example, part of the Scottish Enlightenment supported contingent rational­
ity which depended upon people adhering to certain substantive beliefs. It was 
neither necessary and universal nor was it radically local and a matter of what 
we call “rhetoric ” now. What would you say about this middle realm ?
I would say that it’s our old familiar friend, Aristotelian practical reasoning, but 
I would say that I don’t see much of a distinction between that and my own form 
of thought. So “radically local” is not necessarily a description that I would fix 
to my own views, although you might say more about what you mean by 
“radically local.”
PS: When I read statements of yours like “we have difference all the way 
down... ”
Now that I think is true. But of course, in the following sense. By that I mean no 
more than what C.S. Peirce means when he talks about “the tenacity of belief.” 
There comes a point when the usual gestures of accommodation and civilized 
deference no longer do the job of keeping some elemental or fundamental 
conflict from rising. And at that point, there is nothing more to say.
I would use an illustration from Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine. 
Augustine makes a series of statements, which usually have this form: “No one
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would be so unreasonable as to think” or “Every reasonable person would say,” 
and then something follows. Now what follows is some statement about the 
existence of God, or the nature of the Trinity, or the obligations of man in relation 
to an all-powerful God. It becomes quite clear that what Augustine means by a 
reasonable person is one who accepts unquestioningly a certain set of axiomatic 
propositions. What we, as post-Enlightenment rationalists, mean by a reason­
able person is someone who is willing, in fact eager, to submit any and all of his 
or her views, beliefs, commitments to something called “rational critique” or the 
deliberative process. That’s a huge divide. That divide cannot be mitigated, 
reconciled, worked through, found to meet on a middle ground, or any of those 
things. That’s why liberalism has so much difficulty, which I think is defining 
of it, in taking religious thought seriously. Religious thought is simply the 
necessarily-suppressed “other” in liberal thinking. So when Stephen Carter 
writes The Culture of Disbelief or George Marsden writes The Soul of the 
American University and they attempt to argue that the liberal majority should 
take religious thinking more seriously, they have themselves in making that 
argument fallen back into liberal notions of rationality and the possibility that by 
sympathetically considering the other fellow’s position you could in fact come 
to understand what he or she is about. I don’t believe that for a second, which is 
the content of “difference all the way down.”
I think of civilization or society as a series of attempts which always 
have to be redone or refashioned to build fragile structures which stand between 
us and that moment of confrontation with the large and ultimate differences 
between our points of view. In that sense the historical emergence of liberalism 
as a form of government is a response to this very awareness of how elemental 
conflicts over substantive matters, if they are unchecked or somehow not 
bracketed, will lead to bloodshed. The impulse of liberal authority is generous 
and with a very wide and just appeal—it’s anti-war, it’s anti-bloodshed. But then 
the question turns at a certain point. You could mark it with any number of 
historical analyses—of course everyone uses Nazi Germany, but you could use 
Rwanda or Bosnia. I ask the question about the point at which the spirit of 
accommodation, deference, avoidance in fact produces greater evils than the 
evils you wish to avoid by instituting a sense of liberal procedural government. 
That’s my sense of “difference all the way down.” Of course like anyone else 
who likes to lead the pleasant life, I don’t go around looking for elemental 
conflicts that can be raised to the level of social consciousness so that my life and 
the life of the person to whom I am opposed become unbearable.
PS: I think another nice example of that is in the preface to the section about you 
and Dinesh D ’Souza in There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech. You and he had 
a series of heated debates during your 1991-92 lecture tour, but you noted that 
off stage your interactions were always cordial—you ate together, played tennis, 
and enjoyed each other’s company.
Well, I’m uneasy about that. One of my best students called me on that. He said,
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“I think that that preface is wrong. That preface is precisely a concession to the 
kind of liberal sentimentalism that you are arguing against.” I didn’t have an 
answer for him. And I still don’t.
PS: I read it as an illustration of your claim that theory has no consequences, that 
there can he an underlying civility between you and him in social settings, and 
the principles that you espouse in a different forum make little difference.
Well actually in that particular case that’s not true. I can think of few books 
making more difference in a material way than Dinesh’s book having to do with 
the educational system. Any book that sells in the hundreds of thousands and is 
carried around by students as if it were a Bible has some influence. Dinesh’s book 
is an extremely good book. I don’t like most of it. It’s extraordinarily sneaky and 
Jesuitical in its strategies—he did have a Jesuit education, by the way. But it was 
extremely well done, and the worst thing that the progressive Left in the academy 
did during the reviewing of Illiberal Education was to hold it out as though it 
were a piece of smelly garbage and review it in that vein. That just played right 
into the game. It validated one of his theses, which was that academics are a 
bunch of disdainful elitists who don’t want to talk to anyone but themselves and 
are playing their own little game at your expense. And along come these highly 
indignant high profile academic reviewers who demonstrate this disdain. They 
were paid agents as far as I can tell. But I always took him seriously.
PS: Let me get back to the liberalism question and the idea that toleration can 
extend too far. Another problem that’s been noted many times is liberalism’s 
ethical evisceration.
It’s a brief against commitment as I like to put it.
PS: You claim that values only grow in particular political commitments and that 
they wither in abstractions like reason, merit or fairness. This seems to me to 
overlook the very real work that principles like fairness can do within the context 
of the everyday, for example, when we are grading our students. At times, you 
seem to attack the idea of fairness on epistemological or maybe ontological 
grounds—that we all necessarily have only partial and hence political views. But 
it seems to me that fairness is often a moral maxim which serves to limit or 
restrain our actions. Do you see no place for it even in those contingent 
circumstances?
I certainly have never said not to use the word or the maxim. What I am saying 
is that as a moral maxim “be fair” is more or less on the level of a maxim that I 
wish I could live up to, “be perfect.” The problem with these maxims is that you 
must put them into action in relation to some notion of perfection which is itself 
going to be disputable. So the idea of being fair, if by “fair” you mean 
evenhanded in relation to no underlying substantive presuppositions, is not
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cashable, to use a Rortyism. The idea of being fair in relation to the goals or 
teleology of the practices or lifeworld you’re inhabiting seems to me to be a 
perfectly good idea. But when the word “fair” is used as it has been in the recent 
arguments about, say, affirmative action or canon revision or faculty hiring 
practices, the word is not used in a serious way. It is used as a weapon, just as the 
word “merit” is used as a weapon in order to discredit what might be called efforts 
at reform, but which are now described peremptorily in a quick knockout move 
as being in violation of merit. So when I attack a term like “merit” or “fairness” 
or “colorblind” or “principles,” I am attacking those terms because of the bad 
work I see them doing in discourse attached to agendas I despise and propagated 
by persons that I believe to be dishonest, disreputable, and evil.
KS: Let me ask a local question. In your lecture at the Law School yesterday you 
summed up persuasively the pragmatic effect of (most) speech acts, “Speech 
chills, well, that’s it's job. ” I want to refer you to the University of Iowa's policy 
on professional ethics and academic responsibility. As you may know, it was in 
effect imposed on the academic community by the State Board of Regents and 
subsequently reworded by the President of the University. In my mind the effect 
of this policy is to make speech acts, if they happen in the classroom, lukewarm.
Lukewarm how?
KS: By taking the rhetorical edge off speech acts.
Why does that follow?
KS: It frames class materials in a particular way. For example, if you 're dealing 
with alternative lifestyles, it frames them with the phrase “unusual or unex­
pected" which puts them in the same context over and over again; they are 
always “unusual and unexpected."
Therefore they are, by definition, oddly situated in relation to mainstream 
thought.
KS: Exactly. How wouldyou comment on this policy in terms of your views of free 
speech and professionalism?
First of all, I would say that I don ’ t know enough about the case, and that my very 
commitment to local sites of knowledge and practice makes me generally loathe 
to walk into a situation and comment on it. Having tried to protect myself by 
making this statement, what this section of the policy touches is the question of 
academic freedom which only came up tangentially yesterday. Academic 
freedom is an extremely complicated topic. There are at least two kinds. On the 
one hand, there is the freedom of a university or college from outside interfer­
ence, be it from regents or legislators. On the other, one often thinks of academic
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Ifreedom as the freedom of the individual instructor or student within a particular 
educational structure. Obviously it’s not going to take too long before these two 
come in conflict, before some faculty member appeals to an outside authority in 
the name of academic freedom which he thinks has been violated by his 
institution, and asks the outside authority to violate the academic freedom of the 
institution to protect his individual academic freedom. So, it doesn’t seem to me 
that academic freedom is a clear-cut concept, and that when it’s waved around 
as a marker it isn’t extremely helpful, although it may be rhetorically effective, 
and in fact often is rhetorically effective.
In a case like this, I would want to take a look at the position of the 
University, about which I know nothing, and ask how this action fits into a 
pattern? To what history, if any, does it connect? If we, as the university 
community, resisted that action, would it be at a price that in the fairly near future 
would bring to us worse troubles than what we now see? Or rather, is it the case 
that we can, using a notion like “academic freedom” as a vehicle, riding it as it 
were, at this moment so protect this that we can emerge relatively unscathed? So 
it would seem to me to be a practical problem of calculation in relation to both 
the short and long term interests of the university.
KS: In other words, you’re saying that “ academic freedom” is a concept very 
much like “liberalism”...
Yes, that’s right. Academic freedom as a real principle is silly. What does that 
mean? Could it really mean that a professor who got a degree and an appointment 
can say anything he likes in a department that found his views objectionable, 
unprofessional, disruptive; that they have no recourse because he is credentialed? 
That seems highly unlikely. Does it mean, for example, that history departments 
must seriously consider Holocaust deniers who present themselves as serious 
historians and say that what they’re doing is revisionist history, just as there are 
people who are now questioning the English Civil War or the Middle Ages. “All 
of these modes of thinking are part and parcel of academic work,” say the 
Holocaust deniers, “therefore why can’t we legitimately have our place in the 
university structure?” If you accept that deeply relativistic and skeptical argu­
ment, then of course you have no answer. At which point the whole notion of 
“academic freedom” as a real entity that can be invoked with full force 
disappears. “Academic freedom” turns out to mean the freedom to pursue 
avenues of research within those parameters that a discipline defines as accept­
able and appropriate. That’s academic freedom.
The idea that every time an outside agent, be it your Department Chair, 
your Dean, or even your Board of Regents, sets some limits to or becomes part 
of an effort to scrutinize your classroom procedures your academic freedom has 
been violated—this just doesn’t hold water. That makes it into a pragmatic 
question in relation to the goals and purposes to which you feel yourself 
committed. It becomes a question of ad hoc balancing. What’s at stake here? Is 
this the kind of act where if we let this one go, then down the road they’ll be
89
writing our book lists for us? Or is this just political window dressing, and if we 
allow it, it will result in our budget being increased by 4 million dollars? Those 
are the kind of questions that I want to ask, and if I decided that this is the kind 
of thing that we, the university, could win at little cost, then I would rev up the 
“academic freedom” machine and see how far it might take one.
Another way of thinking about academic freedom which is particularly 
appropriate for this policy has to do with an argument about whether universities 
should be regarded primarily as large free speech forums or as workplaces. Of 
course, the answer to that question is that both analogies make sense, and they 
are figured or weighed differently in different parts of the university at different 
times. But the reason that I favor the workplace as an analogy is that the people 
who are invoking the open free speech forum model are doing so in an effort to 
stop sexual harassment policies from being enacted, to stop any effort by 
universities to regulate the speech of homophobes, anti-Semites, etc. Those 
forces who are pointing to the university as a free-speech forum are doing so in 
relation to ends and purposes I despise. Whereas the people who are pointing to 
the university as a workplace are trying to tie the university to Title VII, anti- 
discrimination policies, and therefore introduce strongly into the university the 
notion that everyone who is in a university has the right to move around in an 
atmosphere that is not hostile, intimidating, and threatening. That seems to me 
to be a good thing, and therefore I’m on that side in this particular choice. I can 
easily imagine a case where I would be on the other side, when the policies, 
views, or practices that I supported were being threatened somehow by the 
workplace analogy. And I would start yelling “free speech,” although I would 
probably have to distance myself about 10 years from my present writing in order 
to make it credible.
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